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AN UNINTENDED CASUALTY OF  
THE WAR ON TERROR 
Aya Gruber∗ 
ABSTRACT 
As the dust of the Bush administration’s war on terror settles, 
casualties are starting to appear on the legal battlefield. The United 
States’ human rights reputation and the Supreme Court’s 
international influence lay wounded in the wake of U.S. policies that 
flouted international law by advocating torture, suborning indefinite 
detention, and erecting irregular tribunals. Through declining citation, 
the courts of the world are telling the Supreme Court that if it does 
not respect international and foreign law, international and foreign 
courts will not respect it. Some might object that the Supreme Court 
should not be lumped with the Bush administration because in fact it 
handed down several opinions setting limitations on the 
administration’s treatment of terror detainees. While these cases, 
notably Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, set forth domestic law limitations, their 
conspicuous effort to avoid giving the Geneva Conventions the force 
of law served to confirm world opinion that the Supreme Court is 
“out of step.” This Essay demonstrates how the Court’s avoidance of 
the treaty status issue in Hamdan not only contributed to the 
perception of American legal exceptionalism but also paved the way 
for the single most anti-international opinion in Supreme Court 
history, Medellín v. Texas. In Medellín, the Supreme Court adopted a 
legal stance that creates near impassable barriers to the domestic 
enforcement of treaties. Nonetheless, as President Obama ruminates 
on maintaining military tribunals and courts brace for another round 
of terrorism cases, the Supreme Court may yet have a chance to 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗  Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I thank Jorge Esquirol, John Stack, 
Lakshmann Guruswamy, Tung Yin, and Robert Chesney for their helpful input. This Essay draws upon 
the seminal treaty jurisprudence scholarship of Jordan Paust, Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Louis Henkin, 
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narrow the reach of Medellín, confirm the enforceability of the 
Geneva Conventions, and restore its international influence. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States’ war on terror has produced a lesser-discussed 
but very important casualty: the international reputation of the 
Supreme Court. Today, many scholars both within and outside the 
United States note the dwindling influence of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, as evidenced by declining worldwide citation. On September 
17, 2008, the front page of the New York Times declared, “U.S. Court 
Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations.”1 The article observes that citations 
to the Canadian Supreme Court and European Court of Justice are on 
an upswing, especially in cases involving human rights, while, 
according to Professor Anne Marie Slaughter, “We are losing one of 
the greatest bully pulpits we have ever had.”2 The bottom line is that 
much of today’s world views U.S. Supreme Court opinion as 
antiquated and out-of-step with modern constructions of global rights 
and obligations.3 To be sure, several aspects of American legal 
practice garnered international disfavor even before the September 11 
attacks, notably the nation’s continued legal support for the death 
penalty.4 Subsequently, the war on terror and its concurrent 
destruction of civil liberties, embrace of torture and indefinite 
detention, and contempt for international humanitarian law cemented 
the widespread view of America as the prototypical abuser of human 
rights rather than guarantor.5 In short, the courts of the world are 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Adam Liptak, U.S. Court Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. (noting that the decline of U.S. Supreme Court influence can be attributed in part to “new 
and sophisticated” constitutional courts that are more liberal than the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 4. See John Quigley, “If You Are Not A United States Citizen . . .”: International Requirements in 
the Arrest of Foreigners, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 661, 666−67 (2009) (noting negative public opinion in 
Europe towards death penalty and discussing foreign states’ interventions in U.S. death penalty cases on 
behalf of foreign defendants). 
 5. David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantánamo 
Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 133 (2008) (observing that because of the 
United States’ “[r]efusal to apply the Geneva Conventions, indefinite detentions based on flimsy 
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saying that if the U.S. does not respect international and foreign law, 
international and foreign courts will not respect the U.S.6  
As President Obama recedes from his initial stance against ad hoc 
military justice7 and federal courts prepare for another round of 
military tribunal challenges,8 we should remain poignantly focused 
on the reputational damage caused by the Bush administration’s 
“cowboy adventure into totalitarianism,”9 which was permitted to 
push forward even by “liberal” “obstructionist” Supreme Court 
decisions.10 As we move into a new era of international relations and 
(hopefully) respect for human rights, the time is ripe to learn some 
lessons about what was and what was not decided in the Supreme 
Court terrorism cases. This Essay highlights how an unfortunate 
misstep in the seemingly internationalist Hamdan v. Rumsfeld11 
decision paved the way for a jurisprudence of hostility toward 
international law. In this way, progressive Justices actually became 
complicit in the legal isolationist ideology so prevalent during the 
Bush era, which led the courts of the world to abandon the Supreme 
Court. 
                                                                                                                 
evidence, detainee abuse, and the questionable invasion of Iraq . . . American stature in world public 
opinion has declined from sympathetic victim to pariah.”). 
 6. David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1, 60–61 (2002) [hereinafter Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties] (asserting that the United States’ 
“cynical” approach to international law is contrary to its national interests). 
 7. Obama issued a campaign statement asserting, “It’s time to better protect the American people 
and our values by bringing swift and sure justice to terrorists through our courts and our Uniform Code 
of Military Justice.” See Obama Speaks on Hamdan Conviction, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2008, available at 
http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2008/08/obama_speaks_on_hamdan_convict.html. 
He has since retreated from that promise. See also infra notes 191−96. 
 8. See Peter Finn, Obama Set to Revive Military Commissions, WASH. POST, May 9, 2009, at A1, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/08/AR2009050804228. 
html; see infra note 194. 
 9. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the Maurice A. 
Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 415 (2004). 
 10. See infra notes 49−51 and accompanying text (discussing perception of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557 (2006), as a victory for liberals). 
 11. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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I.  A GLOBALIST COURT IN AN AGE OF NATIONALISM 
There can be little dispute that during the Bush administration 
years, especially those immediately following September 11, 
internationalism fell out of popular and political favor. Guantánamo, 
renditions, torture, and the unilateral invasion of Iraq served as stark 
examples of the United States’ go-it-alone mentality regarding human 
rights and humanitarian law. This attitude was arguably a 
continuation of the administration’s pre-September 11 
“exceptionalist”12 approach to human rights.13 Foreign jurists and 
human rights supporters had already been shocked at President 
Bush’s “unsigning” of the Rome Statute, thereby withdrawing 
support for the International Criminal Court,14 and the United States’ 
refusal to participate in international environmental regulation.15 Of 
course, after September 11, as isolationist sentiment rose, America’s 
acceptance of international law further decreased.  
Indeed, many Americans, including important legal actors, openly 
express contempt for international law and legal institutions.16 In this 
view, international human rights law is a dirty phrase synonymous 
with loss of American sovereignty and radical liberal ideology.17 
Following September 11, isolationist sentiment intensified as society 
became increasingly averse to international law, foreign values, and 
                                                                                                                 
 12. The term “exceptionalism” is used to describe the view that “as the exceptional nation, America 
should be a model . . . with a special and unique destiny to lead the rest of the world to freedom and 
democracy.” Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and 
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1582−83 (2006). Thus, “American 
exceptionalism has always had two sides: the one eager to set the world to rights, the other ready to turn 
its back with contempt if its message should be ignored.” MARGARET MACMILLAN, PEACEMAKERS: 
THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1919 AND ITS ATTEMPT TO END WAR 22 (2001). 
 13. See Philippe Sands, Lawless World? The Bush Administration and Iraq: Issues of International 
Legality and Criminality, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295, 301 (2006) (noting that the “[war 
on terror]” provided a “terrific opportunity to promote the ‘anti-international law’ project”).  
 14. See Jean Galbraith, The Bush Administration’s Response to the International Criminal Court, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 683, 686−90 (2003). 
 15. See Karin Mickelson, Leading Towards a Level Playing Field, Repaying Ecological Debt, or 
Making Environmental Space: Three Stories About International Environmental Cooperation, 43 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 137, 143−47 (2005). 
 16. See Liptak, supra note 1 (“Americans are deeply suspicious of foreign law.”). 
 17. See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 52 (2004) 
(describing “nationalist jurisprudence” in which foreign law is considered “irrelevant, or worse yet, an 
impermissible imposition on the exercise of American sovereignty”). 
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even foreigners.18 Today, conservatives warn against the corrupting 
influence of foreign practices and characterize international law as a 
product of “elite” law professors who are not representative of the 
nation’s views.19 The body of international scholars has been 
described by even prominent law professors as either “feather boa-
wearing”20 liberal snobs intent on imposing patrician continental 
norms on ordinary American folk,21 or worse, terrorism 
sympathizers.22 One professor characterized the Supreme Court’s 
citation of foreign and international sources as a product of 
“aristocratic” global “bonding” sessions at “Lake Como or the South 
of France.”23  
However, if the executive’s actions and public opinion confirmed 
to the world that the United States disdains international law, what 
about actions of the Supreme Court itself? In the early part of the 
decade it appeared that an emerging globalist Supreme Court attitude 
could provide a much-needed foil to the existence and perception of 
American legal exceptionalism.24 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
former Justice O’Connor vocally extolled the importance of 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 HOW. L.J. 611, 679 (2007) (“[I]n the post 9/11 
environment . . . heightened security concerns have also generated heightened levels of xenophobic 
animosity . . . .”). 
 19. John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 314 (2006). 
 20. This is an actual quote from a law professor who shall remain nameless. 
 21. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
291, 330 (2005) (arguing that internationalist judges “stand at the very apex of [international] elites”). 
 22. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867, 879 (2004) 
(calling the internationalist “a rudderless person in search of a fundamental identity [who] may well find 
himself or herself in the comfort of zealotry and the community of terror”); see also U.S. DEP’T. OF 
DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (Mar. 2005) 
[hereinafter DEFENSE STATEMENT], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/ 
d20050318nds2.pdf (“Our strength as a nation-state will continue to be challenged by those who employ 
a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.”). 
 23. McGinnis, supra note 19, at 327. To be sure, decrying liberal pretention has been a time-honored 
rhetorical strategy of old segregationists and modern neo-conservatives. Recall Dan Quayle’s 
description of the “liberal elites” as sneering, cynical, sophisticates who supported radical ideologies 
like gay rights. Andrew Rosenthal, The 1992 Campaign; Quayle Attacks a “Cultural Elite,” Saying It 
Mocks Nation’s Values, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/10/us/1992-campaign-quayle-attacks-cultural-elite-saying-it-mocks-
nation-s-values.html. 
 24. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 176 (2004) (calling recent Court activity a “breakthrough” in the 
“internationalization of the law” (quoting Charlotte Ku & Christopher J. Borgen, American Lawyers and 
International Competence, 18 DICK. J. INT’L L. 493, 505–11 (2000))). 
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international and comparative law in domestic constitutional 
jurisprudence.25 In the 2003 decision Lawrence v. Texas, the Court 
cited international norms as part of its analysis striking down anti-
sodomy laws.26 In 2005, the Court took up the hotly-contested issue 
of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons.27 In a move that 
many conservatives saw, and continue to see, as an all-out assault on 
American values and sovereignty, the Court cited international 
sentiment as “confirmation” of its formal conclusion that putting 
juveniles to death is cruel and unusual.28 Many, like Justice Ginsburg, 
believed that the Court’s “‘island’ or ‘lone ranger’ mentality [was] 
beginning to change.”29  
The Supreme Court was in the midst of a modest revolution, 
inching towards globalization despite great internal conflict30 and 
external controversy.31 At the same time, the Court was asked to 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., The Supreme Court and 
The New International Law, Remarks to the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-04-03.html (“[E]ver stronger 
consensus (now near world-wide) as to the importance of protecting basic human rights, the 
embodiment of that consensus in legal documents, such as national constitutions and international 
treaties, and the related decision to enlist judges—i.e., independent judiciaries—as instruments to help 
make that protection effective in practice.”); see also Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 6, at 
21–24 (discussing statements from Justices regarding international and foreign law). 
 26. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
 27. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 28. Id. at 575 (“Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for 
offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the 
world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”). 
 29. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative 
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 335 (2004). Still, some 
remained skeptical of the Court’s burgeoning devotion to international norms. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, 
International Law Before the Supreme Court: A Mixed Record of Recognition, 45 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 829, 855 (2005) [hereinafter Paust, Mixed Record] (noting that in 2004 term, Supreme Court 
viewed international law “obliquely” and often used it merely to supplement domestic construction); 
Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 325 (2006) (asserting that in cases implicating U.S. interest, the Court has 
avoided international law but upheld its goals through broad interpretation of U.S. Constitutional 
provisions). 
 30. Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that approval by ‘other nations 
and peoples’ should buttress our commitment to American principles any more than (what should 
logically follow) disapproval by ‘other nations and peoples’ should weaken that commitment.”). 
 31. Cohen, supra note 29, at 273 (describing how after the Supreme Court’s citation of foreign law 
in its opinion striking down juvenile death penalty, “[T]he halls of Congress seemed to shudder with 
anger as congressmen and senators rushed to react.”). The Republican outcry has made an appearance in 
Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings. Arizona Senator Jon Kyl responded 
to Sotomayor’s past statement that courts should look at “good ideas” from foreign law by stating, “The 
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assess the parameters of the Bush administration’s war on terror. 
Here, political sides had been quickly drawn regarding constitutional 
restraints on executive war-making power,32 with conservatives 
generally arguing for unfettered or near limitless executive authority 
and liberals favoring significant congressional and judicial 
oversight.33 Lurking in the substrata of the various civil liberties-
versus-national security debates was a bubbling political polarization 
over the enforceability of international law. The Geneva 
Conventions34 were arguably the greatest threat to the Bush 
administration’s ability to wage the war on terror in any manner it 
saw fit, even greater than the Constitution. There is very little 
language in the Constitution regarding presidential war power, and 
the principle that during war the President can bypass other 
constitutional provisions is largely a creature of expert commentary 
and sparse case law.35 Because the “law of war” is therefore extra-
constitutional, it provided the Supreme Court a virtual tabula rasa 
                                                                                                                 
laws and practices of foreign nations are simply irrelevant to interpreting the will of the American 
people as expressed through our Constitution.” Kate Phillips, Live Blogging the Sotomayor Hearings, 
N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (July 13, 2009, 1:30 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/ 
live-blogging-the-sotomayor-hearings. 
 32. Interestingly, although some commentators object to the concept of a rhetorical “war” on terror, 
see, e.g., Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of the Japanese Internment in the 
Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 307, 366 (2006) (arguing that treating counterterrorism activities 
as legal “war” allows the government to “freely ignore the Constitution in any prosecution of alleged 
terrorists”), the Court and public for the most part seem to accept that we are at “war” in some fashion. 
See Detlev Vagts, Military Commissions: Constitutional Limits on Their Role in the War on Terror, 102 
AM. J. INT’L L. 573, 580–81 (2008) (noting that Justices’ views range from considering the U.S. at war 
with Taliban to viewing the U.S. as at war with “radical Islam”); cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
521 (2004) (“If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts 
that informed the development of the law of war, [the war paradigm] may unravel. But that is not the 
situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are 
ongoing in Afghanistan.”). 
 33. Immediately after 9-11, even Democrats appeared deferential to President Bush. See Aya Gruber, 
Who’s Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1021−27 (2007) (discussing the debate between 
Bush supporters and internationalists). 
 34. Most of the arguments regarding the Guantánamo detainees were made under the Third Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. 
 35. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (2006). See generally Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. 
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) 
(discussing only two Supreme Court cases as precedent for military tribunal). 
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legal regime on which to scrawl its limitations (or non-limitations).36 
Thus, the Bush administration could reasonably hope to exploit the 
atmosphere of fear and hysteria surrounding September 11 in favor of 
an expansive judicial reading of constitutional war power.37 
By contrast, the Geneva Conventions lay out with clarity and great 
specificity how governments must treat prisoners of war, civilians, 
and others during times of armed conflict.38 The treaty accordingly 
represented a significant potential restraint on how the Bush 
administration could treat detained Afghan and al Qaeda fighters. 
From the beginning, the Bush administration pursued a policy of 
“lawyering” the Conventions39 and setting forth numerous textual 
arguments, from specious to plausible, as to why they do not apply to 
the Guantánamo detainees.40 It was obviously important for public 
relations reasons that the administration find a way to convince the 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1062 (2003) (“Courts are able to apply an emergency-sensitive 
interpretation to constitutional arrangements, structures, powers, and rights. Governmental powers may 
expand, and the scope of rights protection may contract, so that the crisis can be met effectively.”). 
 37. White House counsel lawyers advocated for an interpretation of war powers that would permit 
the President to bypass the Constitution, domestic legislation, and treaties. See, e.g., Memorandum from 
John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes 
II, General Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 10–11 (Jan. 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy//documents/20011023.pdf (emphasizing President’s 
uncontestable commander-in-chief powers); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 34 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf 
(asserting that Commander-in-Chief power overrides any limitations imposed by federal legislation and 
Convention Against Torture); see Katyal & Tribe, supra note 35, at 1269 (“[T]he Bush Administration 
has sought to convert the singular Commander-in-Chief Clause into a textual warrant for exceptional 
unilateralism.”). 
 38. See also Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hostage-Taking, 
31 VA. J. INT’L L. 351, 368 (1991) (observing that “it is difficult to imagine a more mandatory, 
controlling, detailed, definable, universal, and useful set of treaty standards” than those in the Geneva 
Conventions). 
 39. David Glazier, Full and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regulating 
Military Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 55, 119 (2006) (maintaining that Bush engaged in a 
“‘hyper-technical legal analysis’ to exploit ambiguities” in the Geneva Conventions) (quoting Geoffrey 
S. Corn, Op-Ed., When the Law of War Becomes Over-lawyered, JURIST, Nov. 25, 2005, available at 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2005/11/when-law-of-war-becomes-over-lawyered.php). 
 40. For example, the administration first argued that because the Taliban was an illegitimate 
government, the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the Afghan conflict, but then it receded from that 
argument. The administration also argued that laws of war do not apply to “unlawful” combatants and 
made much of the fact that the Taliban fighters did not wear uniforms. For an overview of these 
arguments, see Gruber, supra note 33, at 1023–24. 
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public that it was in compliance with the Conventions,41 but in the 
legal arena the administration advanced an argument for the 
wholesale jettisoning of the Geneva Conventions in domestic courts: 
“Non-self-execution.” The administration claimed simply that as non-
self-executing treaties, the Geneva Conventions could not be 
enforced by individuals in U.S. courts.42 In turn, the formerly 
legalistic question of treaty execution became as highly politicized as 
the civil liberties-versus-national security debate. 
Of course, the question of treaty execution long predated the war 
on terror. The status of treaties is mentioned in the very text of the 
Constitution, in the Supremacy Clause, which declares that “all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution 
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”43 During the 
early years of our republic, the fact of treaty supremacy was 
relatively apolitical and apparently accepted.44 The period 
immediately following World War II saw a flurry of international 
legal activity and thrust the question of treaty supremacy into the 
foreground.45 Since that time, there has been steadily growing 
hostility in certain legal, academic, and political circles to the concept 
that treaties created in part or whole by “foreign entities” are binding 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See Media Note No. 2005/994 from U.S. Dep’t of State, Invitation to UN Special Rapporteurs to 
Visit Guantánamo Bay Detention Facilities (Oct. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/55756.htm (“U.S. policy is to treat all detainees in accordance 
with its international obligations and in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva 
Convention.”); Memorandum from President Bush on the Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL 
TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS app. C (2004) [hereinafter 2002 Bush Memo], available at 
http://wid.ap.org/documents/iraq/040824finalreport.pdf. 
 42. See DEFENSE STATEMENT, supra note 22, at 19−20; Brief for Respondents at 9, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 460875 (asserting that the Geneva Conventions 
are non-self-executing). 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 44. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 764–66 (1988) [hereinafter 
Paust, Self-Executing Treaties]. 
 45. See David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 579, 
585 (2002) (noting that post-World War II era saw “the birth of the modern human rights era”). 
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domestic law.46 Although a topic of moderate activity in lower courts, 
until the last few years the Supreme Court had said very little on the 
issue and had not adopted the position that treaties are generally non-
self-executing.47 
It was upon this historical, political, and legal background that the 
Supreme Court rendered its 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
invalidating Bush’s military tribunals because they violated the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).48 The decision caused a 
feeling that can be fairly characterized as jubilation among 
progressives and internationalists.49 Yale Law School dean and 
international lawyer Harold Koh declared that the Hamdan case 
“finally beg[a]n the much-needed process of turning the legal world 
right-side up again.”50 International law scholar George Fletcher 
dubbed Hamdan a new beginning for international law in the United 
States.51 Perhaps, however, internationalists were advancing a 
premature “mission accomplished” declaration. Upon further 
examination, the Hamdan majority opinion is remarkable in its 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 21, at 326 (rejecting European-influenced law on ground 
that “Europe has been given to fluctuations of ideological extremes” and in Europe “fascism and 
communism, which were once viewed by some as advanced, modern ideologies, were adopted by 
regimes that murdered millions”). See generally Gruber, supra note 33, at IV.B (discussing development 
of anti-treaty ideology). 
 47. See David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court 
Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez–Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20, 101 (2006) 
(observing that before World War II, the Court recognized presumption of treaty enforceability and after 
said very little about it); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self–Executing Treaties, 89 
AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 697–700, 722 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, Four Doctrines] (noting that the 
Supreme Court “has not said more than a sentence or two about the distinction in any case for nearly a 
century”). 
 48. Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 173 (D.D.C. 2004). See generally 10 U.S.C. § 801 
(1950). 
 49. See Martin S. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent: Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law, and 
Comparative Executive “Creativity” in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 2005–2006, at 51, 51 
(“Rarely has the Supreme Court handed a ‘wartime’ president a greater defeat, or human rights 
defenders a greater victory [as in Hamdan].”). Bush administration defenders considered the case an 
agonizing defeat. David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, Court’s Ruling Is Likely to Force Negotiations over 
Presidential Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at A21 (quoting White House Counsel Bradford A. 
Berenson as stating of Hamdan, “What is truly radical is the Supreme Court’s willingness to bend to 
world opinion and undermine some of the most important foundations of American national security law 
in the middle of a war.”). 
 50. Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2352 (2006). 
 51. See generally George P. Fletcher, The Hamdan Case and Conspiracy as a War Crime: A New 
Beginning for International Law in the U.S., 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 442 (2006). 
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judicial restraint. Although it invalidated Bush’s tribunals, it did so 
on the narrow ground that they violate the UCMJ, a domestic statute 
that was about to be superseded by the Military Commissions Act 
(MCA).52 Hamdan did not pronounce any significant constitutional 
limitations on presidential war power,53 nor did it reach the 
overriding foreign relations question of treaty execution.54 
Hamdan indeed would have been one of the greatest 
internationalist victories had the Supreme Court been willing, after 
nearly fifty years of silence, to recognize the force of international 
law in the face of decades of growing post-World War II isolationism 
that pinnacled after September 11. Unfortunately, the Court appeared 
to fear weighing in on the issue and went to great lengths to stay mute 
on whether the Geneva Conventions constitute valid domestic law. 
The Hamdan majority’s refusal to comment on the status of the 
Conventions left open a dangerous door for a divided Court, now 
politically polarized over the treaty execution issue, to finally adopt 
an isolationist stance toward treaty execution. This is the precise door 
the Court walked through with its March 25, 2008 decision, Medellín 
v. Texas.55 What started out as fear of international human rights law 
in Hamdan went to loathing in Medellín, as the Court for the first 
time formally sanctioned the United States’ ability to double deal in 
international relations.56 But before discussing Medellín, two 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2601 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a). 
 53. For example, the Court avoided answering whether in cases of “controlling necessity,” the 
President could unilaterally establish a military tribunal. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (2005) 
(“[Whether] the President may constitutionally convene military commissions ‘without the sanction of 
Congress’ in cases of ‘controlling necessity’ is a question this Court . . . need not answer today.”). The 
Court also did not require that tribunals be established by Congress, but merely asserted they could not 
violate a pre-existing congressional limitation. Id. at 593 n.23 (“Whether or not the President has 
independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not 
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his 
powers.”). In addition, the Court did not rule out the possibility that the political branches acting 
together could establish a standing war crime tribunal, although dicta reveal the majority’s concerns 
with such a tribunal. Id. at 597−98 (noting that tribunal in Quirin represents “high water mark” of war 
power and suggesting that establishing such tribunal outside “theater of war” does not comport with 
common law) (quoting WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831 (2d ed. 1920)). 
 54. Id. at 627−28 (assuming that the Geneva Conventions did not provide Hamdan with individually 
enforceable rights). 
 55. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 56. Francisco Forrest Martin, The Constitution and Human Rights: The International Legal 
Constructionist Approach to Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights, 1 FIU L. REV. 71, 85–86 (2006) 
 
11
Gruber: An Unintended Casualty of the War on Terror
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:2 
 
310
preliminary questions call for examination. First, what is the status of 
treaties in U.S. domestic law? Second, why was Hamdan’s approach 
to the Geneva Conventions harmful to the Supreme Court’s 
international reputation?  
II.  SELF-EXECUTING AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES 
The question of the status of treaties in domestic law is not unique 
to the United States. Every signatory nation to a treaty must grapple 
with the extent to which it will incorporate international law into its 
national legal system. Experts have identified two predominant 
approaches to the domestic application of treaty law: “dualist” and 
“monist.”57 In dualist systems, like Great Britain, even if the country 
signs a treaty guaranteeing individual rights, individuals have no 
ability to enforce those rights unless Parliament passes a separate 
domestic law “executing” the treaty.58 Thus, it is said that in dualist 
systems, all treaties are non-self-executing.59 In other words, treaties 
establish international obligations between nations but do not create 
any obligations to individuals who are subjects of the treaty. To 
illustrate, let us assume hypothetically that Britain and Japan signed a 
treaty requiring both countries to allow each other’s citizens to work, 
and a British city administrator denied a Japanese citizen’s 
application for a business license. Under the British approach, in the 
absence of ratifying domestic legislation, the Japanese person would 
not be able to sue the city for violating his treaty rights.60 The concept 
is that Britain has violated its treaty obligation to Japan but has not 
violated the individual Japanese person’s right to work in Britain. 
                                                                                                                 
(characterizing non-self-execution as a “weapon” that permits the United States to be “an outlaw in the 
international community” and engage in “double-dealing by, on the one hand, agreeing to be bound by a 
treaty and, on the other hand, reserving the right to not give the treaty any effect”). 
 57. See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 126 (2004). 
 58. Lord Templeman, Treaty-Making and the British Parliament, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 459, 
481−83 (1991). 
 59. This language comes from Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829), which is widely 
considered the first case dealing with the domestic enforceability of treaties. 
 60. This essentially makes the agreement meaningless. For this reason, internationalists criticize the 
dualist approach for allowing bad-faith treaty signing. See, e.g., Jinks & Sloss, supra note 57, at 124−25. 
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The United States historically has followed a different practice. For 
example, in 1924, the Supreme Court reviewed a case filed by a 
Japanese citizen, Asakura, against the city of Seattle for denying him 
a business license.61 Asakura alleged that such action was illegal, in 
violation of a treaty between the United States and Japan.62 The 
Supreme Court found that given the constitutional supremacy of 
treaties, Asakura could enforce his treaty rights by suing Seattle 
directly.63 The Court adopted a monist approach and refused to 
require executing legislation, reasoning that the Supremacy Clause 
gives treaties the status of federal statutory law.64 The bottom line is 
that the Constitution makes treaties part of “our law.” 
Unfortunately, over the years the water has been muddied with the 
introduction of the self-execution doctrine. In a nutshell, the doctrine 
divides treaties into two classes: self-executing treaties, which do not 
require ratifying legislation to be enforceable, and non-self-executing 
treaties, which do.65 Expert views on self-execution range from 
extremely internationalist, like the opinion that rights-conferring 
treaties are supreme over federal legislation,66 to extremely 
isolationist, like the view that treaties by their nature do not have 
domestic effect and Congress is largely without power to confer it.67 
The conflict, however, is mostly between those who believe that 
treaties are domestically enforceable, subject to ordinary interpretive 
principles (what I will call the “internationalist approach”), and those 
who believe that treaties are presumptively non-self-executing and 
must pass difficult, if not impossible, legal hurdles to be enforceable 
(what I will call the “exceptionalist approach”).  
                                                                                                                 
 61. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924). 
 62. Id. at 340. 
 63. Id. at 341. 
 64. Id.; see also Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 254 (confirming that a “different principle” established by 
the U.S. declares a “treaty to be the law of the land”). 
 65. See generally Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 47 (providing in-depth analysis of self-
execution doctrine). 
 66. See Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 406, 425–26 
(1989) (positing that Framers intended treaties to be supreme over federal statutes). 
 67. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original 
Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2093–94 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism]. 
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The internationalist mantra is quite straightforward: Pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause, treaties should have the status of other federal 
legislation. Thus, the interpretive rules governing whether federal 
legislation creates justiciable rights or individual private rights of 
action apply to treaties.68 If a treaty simply does not confer any rights 
(for example, one that calls for future legislative action only) or does 
not give rise to private lawsuits (for example, one that explicates a 
uniquely international administrative remedy), it cannot be enforced 
judicially. However, treaties that guarantee rights to individuals, 
enforceable via internal or external private rights of action, are 
judicially cognizable—just like federal legislative law.69 So when it 
comes to the Geneva Conventions, the analysis is quite simple. 
Geneva provides wartime detainees with a laundry list of individual 
rights.70 There are several sources from which to derive Guantánamo 
prisoners’ private right to enforce the Geneva Conventions, the most 
obvious being the federal habeas corpus statute, which provides that 
prisoners who are in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws 
or treaties of the United States” may file a petition in federal court 
seeking release.71 Therefore, Guantánamo detainees should be 
permitted to challenge their detention on the ground that such custody 
violates Geneva’s dictates.72 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Thus, like with statutes, courts have an obligation to construe vague treaty terms rather than just 
discarding treaties that merit interpretation. See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 47, at 714. 
 69. Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without 
Trial, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 515 (2003) (“Federal courts have repeatedly held that a treaty need only 
expressly or impliedly provide an individual right for it to be self-enforcing.”). 
 70. E.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 34, arts. 5–7, 14, 84–85, 98, 105–06, 129–30. 
 71. 8 U.S.C. § 2241 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 72. Thus, the Geneva Conventions present a less complicated case than treaties that call on states to 
implement specific provisions under their domestic statutes, like the Convention Against Torture. See 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. 
Res. 39/46, art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (Dec. 10, 1984) 
(“Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.”). One could 
imagine a situation in which a state party either fails to implement the treaty or the implementing 
domestic statute falls short of the treaty’s mandate by, for example, defining torture more narrowly than 
the treaty. Clearly, the state would be in violation of its treaty obligation. If an individual sues that state 
for engaging in acts that constitute torture within the meaning of the treaty, but are lawful under 
domestic law, there would be a thorny interpretive question regarding whether treaty drafters intended 
individual litigants to be able to invoke the treaty rights directly. That is, however, not the case with the 
Geneva Conventions. It does not call upon states to create legislation regarding the treatment of war-
time detainees—it clearly binds states to treat detainees in a certain manner. See, e.g., Third Geneva 
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The exceptionalist approach is not very simple because it is a 
product of ongoing legal obfuscation73 and even manipulation.74 It is 
important to understand what this approach enables. A rule that 
nullifies treaties as domestic law allows the United States to sign 
international human rights agreements and purport to support 
individual rights, while simultaneously divesting those agreements of 
any ability to actually give rights to individuals.75 Even worse, such a 
rule makes old human rights and humanitarian treaties, which were 
signed in good faith by past administrations, easy to ignore by future 
administrations hostile to those rights.76 Indeed, the Bush 
administration hid behind the cloak of non-self-execution in its 
insistence that the Geneva Conventions did not provide individual 
rights to the Guantánamo detainees.77  
To trace the origin of the exceptionalist approach to self-execution, 
one must go back to the 1829 case Foster v. Neilson, which involved 
a dispute over land rights under a treaty between Spain and the 
United States.78 In the treaty, the United States agreed that certain 
land transfers that had occurred between Spain and individuals “shall 
be ratified.”79 The Supreme Court, not wanting the transfers to be 
                                                                                                                 
Convention, supra note 34, art. 13 (“Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any 
unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a 
prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present 
Convention.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Michael Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for 
Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1887 (2005) (calling modern treaty jurisprudence “a combination of 
inattention and Supreme Court rhetorical ambiguity”); Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 47, at 722 
(asserting that modern self-execution doctrine is a result of “sloppy reasoning and careless use of 
precedent”). 
 74. Gruber, supra note 33, at 1065 (“[T]here is evidence that anti-internationalist hostility to treaty 
law, tied to a more sinister desire to preserve racial hierarchy, constituted the driving force behind the 
self-execution doctrine.”). 
 75. Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding “Fraudulent” Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257, 1265 (1993). 
 76. See Gruber, supra note 33, at 1067 (asserting that the self-execution doctrine “creates a clever 
insurmountable barrier to the domestic enforcement of treaties ratified prior to the creation of the 
modern intent doctrine”). 
 77. See supra note 42. 
 78. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 253 (1829). 
 79. The treaty stated in pertinent part that “all the grants of land made before the 24th of January 
1818, by his catholic majesty, & c. shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the 
lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the 
dominion of his catholic majesty.” Id. at 276. 
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legally valid—some say for political and racial 
reasons80interpreted the “shall be ratified” phrase in an awkward 
manner, an interpretation it soon reversed.81 The Court construed the 
word “shall” as signifying that the United States had not intended to 
validate the land transfers by the treaty, but only to promise that the 
transfers would become valid if Congress passed a law ratifying the 
transfers.82 The Court thus opined that when “parties [engage] to 
perform a particular act . . . the legislature must execute the contract 
before it can become a rule for the Court.”83 In essence, under the 
Court’s interpretation, the U.S. promised Spain exactly nothing. 
Realizing this, four years later the Court reinterpreted the treaty to 
say that the treaty itself validated the land grants.84 However bad its 
interpretation of the word “shall,” Foster’s principle is solid: an 
individual simply cannot seek judicial remedy from a treaty that has 
not conferred any individual rights. Today, however, Foster’s modest 
proposition has spawned a line of cases holding that treaties are 
generally non-self-executing and even a treaty clearly conferring 
individual rights can be unenforceable.85 
The evolution from Foster to the modern self-execution doctrine 
occurred over decades, as the U.S. changed from a fledgling republic 
to a world power, and international law and legal structures 
underwent rapid development.86 In the years following Foster, the 
Court continued to view treaties as valid federal law, enforcing those 
that contained justiciable provisions,87 and only refusing to allow 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See, e.g., Henry J. Richardson III, Excluding Race Strategies from International Legal History: 
The Self-Executing Treaty Doctrine and the Southern Africa Tripartite Agreement, 45 VILL. L. REV. 
1091, 1109 (2000) (contending that Foster was “born out of judicial deference to the fruits of military 
conquest, as redefined through congressional statutory arrangements for white occupation and land 
ownership”). 
 81. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 69 (1833) (reversing Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 
253 (1820)). 
 82. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314–15. 
 83. Id. at 314. 
 84. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 69. 
 85. See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Gruber, supra note 33, at 1070–71; Golove, supra note 45, at 585–87 (discussing self-
execution in historical context).  
 87. See Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 44, at 766 (characterizing self-execution doctrine 
as a judicial invention and noting that after Foster, Court continued to enforce treaties as supreme law). 
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individual lawsuits when the treaties clearly created solely 
“horizontal” obligations between nations.88 But with World War II 
came the birth of the international human rights era, including the 
United States’ ratification of the United Nations Charter (U.N. 
Charter) and consideration of the Genocide Convention. These 
international instruments had the potential to significantly impact the 
American legal landscape. 
One California court of appeals case, Sei Fujii v. State,89 and some 
U.S. Supreme Court concurring opinions in Oyama v. California90 
relied on the U.N. Charter to strike down the racially discriminatory 
Alien Land Law.91 These cases were enough to concern conservative 
politicians that international law might spell an end to southern racial 
segregation. In 1951, Republican senator John Bricker introduced a 
draft constitutional amendment (dubbed the “Bricker Amendment”) 
to make all treaties unenforceable in the absence of implementing 
legislation.92 Rather than admit to the underlying segregationist 
purpose, “Brickerites” defended the Amendment as compelled by the 
principle of American domestic sovereignty. One supporter stated 
that the Amendment marked the “line . . . between those Americans 
who believe in the preservation of national sovereignty . . . and those 
who believe that our national independence . . . should yield to . . . 
some kind of world authority.”93 The Bricker Amendment eventually 
failed to pass, and Bricker abandoned his efforts after securing 
                                                                                                                 
See, e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488 (1879); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 
366, 372 (1856); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 592 (1832). 
 88. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884). 
 89. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (“The Alien Land Law must . . . 
yield to the treaty as the superior authority.”). 
 90. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649–50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring) (“[H]ow can this 
nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by 
aliens on account of race are permitted to be enforced?”); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring) 
(“[I]nconsistency with the [U.N.] Charter . . . is but one more reason why the statute must be 
condemned.”). 
 91. The Alien Land Law, 1 Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261 (Deering 1944, 1945 Supp.), prohibited people 
who were “ineligible” for citizenship, specifically Japanese persons, to own land. 
 92. There were several versions of the amendment, but the basic premise of the amendment was to 
ensure that “[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation 
which would be valid in the absence of a treaty.” S. REP. NO. 83-412, at 1 (1953). 
 93. See, e.g., FRANK E. HOLMAN, STORY OF THE “BRICKER” AMENDMENT 22 (1954). 
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assurances from the White House that the President would not sign 
the Genocide Convention.94  
This historical moment demonstrates how the self-execution 
doctrine has long been a vehicle of exceptionalism, permitting 
America to condemn human rights violations abroad, while 
segregating lunch counters at home.95 The Bricker moment signaled 
to conservative jurists that stirring up fears over sovereignty and the 
dangers of the importation of “foreign moods, fads, or fashions”96 
could be a good method of stemming the forward movement of the 
liberal rights agenda.97 After the Bricker era, often warning of the 
significant “costs” of human rights litigation,98 lower courts started to 
chip away at the influence of international law by erecting doctrinal 
hurdles to treaty enforceability.99 
Among other things, courts began to require specific language on 
domestic enforceability or other evidence of drafter intent regarding 
self-execution before finding a treaty enforceable.100 Such legal 
maneuvers to thwart treaty law might seem facially reasonable, but 
upon further examination, they are quite unsound. These courts do 
not determine enforceability by analyzing whether the treaty creates 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 
AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 348–49 (1995). 
 95. See Richardson, supra note 80, at 1117 (“[H]istorical symmetry between the [self-execution] 
Doctrine having been born to uphold a government policy of racial conquest, and the Doctrine’s present 
status of being consistently used by the judiciary and political branches to bar people of color, in a 
context of continuing American racism, from invoking the full width of human rights to which they are 
entitled for protection.”). Harold Koh notes that today the United States has adopted “the perverse 
practice of human rights compliance without ratification.” Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American 
Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (2003). It is likely, however, that Bricker would have 
preferred the United States not sign any human rights treaties in the first place. Today, it is popular for 
politicians on both sides of the aisle to support international human rights regimes, so long as they can 
set their condemnatory sights on “bad” non-Western nations like China and Sudan. 
 96. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002). 
 97. Resnik, supra note 12, at 1606 (“The arguments . . . are remarkably congruent over time: that 
transnational human rights conventions threaten American sovereignty, states’ prerogatives, and the 
domestic order established therein.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 n.16, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Bork, J., concurring). 
 99. Gruber, supra note 33, at 1050–55 (discussing lower court constructions of self-execution 
doctrine). See generally Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 47.  
 100. Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Yoo, Globalism, 
supra note 67, at 2090–91 (asserting that a treaty is non-self-executing unless “the text clearly indicates 
judicial enforcement”). 
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concrete rights and obligations, but rather they look for some extra 
evidence that drafters intended domestic enforceability.101 This is 
akin to a court refusing to enforce federal legislation without some 
provision stating, “And we really mean it.”102 Lower courts have set 
up other barriers to treaty enforcement, like the presumption that 
treaties create only obligations between nations and do not create 
individual rights103 and the requirement that self-executing treaties 
contain express judicial remedy provisions.104 The feather in the 
treaty exceptionalist’s cap is that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law now accepts the view that treaties are not judicially 
enforceable unless there is evidence that the drafters intended self-
execution.105 
This is not to say that the self-execution doctrine is merely a cover 
for racial oppression and the denial of human rights. Those who 
support the doctrine are honestly and deeply concerned with the issue 
of domestic sovereignty. Although sovereigntist anxiety over the 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See, e.g., Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (finding 
Geneva Conventions non-self-executing, despite language in commentaries supporting domestic 
enforcement, because there was “no language to this effect within the agreement itself”). 
 102. Gruber, supra note 33, at 1067 (asserting that using Foster as grounds for creating self-execution 
doctrine is as “untenable as using a routine statutory or contract interpretation case that refuses to 
implement vague terms as a basis for requiring specific language in all statutes and contracts that the 
documents are really enforceable”). Even courts that predicate non-self-execution on evidence that 
treaty makers desired domestic unenforceability tend to reason in an ad hoc manner that would be 
absurd in other legal interpretation contexts. For example, courts often derive such intent from the post-
ratification of individual members of Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 881–82 
(5th Cir. 1979) (finding intent against self-execution in part from statements of individual senator); 
Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1967) (relying on post-ratification statement of 
Attorney General). It would be hard to imagine a court refusing to enforce a contract between, say, 
several corporations because one board member said after the fact he would not abide by the contract. 
 103. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying presumption of 
unenforceability to Geneva Conventions). 
 104. Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003); Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724 
(6th Cir. 2003) (habeas statute only applies to self-executing treaties). However, “where federally 
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to 
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
 105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. h 
(1987) (“[T]he intention of the United States determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in 
the United States.”). It also seems to adopt the presumption of non-self-execution view because it 
implies that the only way for a treaty to be self-executing is for it to overlap with pre-existing domestic 
legislation “adequate to enable the United States to carry out its obligations.” Id. 
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nefarious influence of “world courts”106 is often difficult to 
disentangle from xenophobia, racially-influenced nationalism, or the 
preservation of conservative cultural hegemony, even the most left-
leaning scholar would agree that international law should not displace 
all domestic law. The exceptionalist approach to self-execution, 
however, is simply not required to prevent international law from 
“taking over.”107 Our constitutional structure already contains many 
mechanisms to preserve sovereignty. For example, under the “last-in-
time rule,” Congress has the option to pass domestic legislation 
abrogating a treaty.108 Moreover, the executive retains the political 
option to withdraw from treaties.109 What the self-execution doctrine 
adds is the government’s ability to ratify human rights treaties, 
creating the appearance of respect for human rights, and violate those 
rights without domestic legal liability.110 One wonders whether 
Congress would have supported the Guantánamo detentions if, in 
order to do so, it had to pass legislation specifically repealing the 
venerable Geneva Conventions.111 
Historically, the Supreme Court never jumped on the self-
execution bandwagon, despite the flurry of activity in lower courts. In 
the nearly two centuries between Foster and Hamdan, the Court ruled 
in a number of treaty cases, almost always finding the treaty at issue 
self-executing without regard to specific language on domestic 
enforceability and without requiring particular evidence of drafter 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for 
taking into account “the practices of the ‘world community,’ whose notions of justice are (thankfully) 
not always those of our people”). 
 107. Cf. John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-
Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2236 (1999) (“[I]f the United States forges multilateral agreements 
addressing problems that were once domestic in scope, treaties could replace legislation as a vehicle for 
domestic regulation.”). 
 108. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
 109. For example, after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found the United States to be in 
violation of its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the Avena case, see 
infra notes 140–144 and accompanying text, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention, which requires Vienna claims to be submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 500 (2008). 
 110. This is classic exceptionalism. See supra note 12. 
 111. See Gruber, supra note 33, at 1064 (“[Congress] would likely have been exceedingly reluctant to 
repeal explicitly a treaty as important and widely-publicized as the Geneva Conventions.”). 
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intent regarding self-execution.112 Justice Breyer sums up the prior 
Supreme Court treaty cases as recognizing: “(1) a treaty obligated the 
United States to treat foreign nationals in a certain manner; (2) the 
obligation had been breached by the Government’s conduct; and (3) 
the foreign national could therefore seek redress for that breach in a 
judicial proceeding, even though the treaty did not specifically 
mention judicial enforcement.”113 The question then becomes: Did 
the Supreme Court have other valid reasons for exercising restraint 
on the Geneva enforceability issue in Hamdan? A careful 
examination of Hamdan’s claims for relief and the interpretive 
analysis warrant an answer in the negative. 
III.  LEAVING THE SELF-EXECUTION DOOR OPEN IN HAMDAN V. 
RUMSFELD 
Hamdan had precisely argued that his Geneva rights were being 
violated by Bush’s military tribunal process and requested the Court 
to enforce his rights by transferring him to a court martial or civilian 
court.114 The most natural course of action would have been for the 
Court to engage a simple two-step inquiry: (1) Do the detainees have 
enforceable rights under the Geneva Conventions; and (2) were these 
rights violated?115 In fact, one of the two “questions presented” to the 
Court in Hamdan’s brief was “[w]hether Petitioner and others 
similarly situated can obtain judicial enforcement from an Article III 
court of rights protected under the 1949 Geneva Convention in an 
action for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of their 
detention by the Executive branch?”116 Ignoring that threshold 
question all together, the Court elected to address only whether the 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court 
Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20, 88 (2006) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has never applied the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties to deny a remedy to an 
individual whose treaty rights were violated.”). 
 113. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 375 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 114. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184). 
 115. This is precisely the way the district court addressed the issue. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. 
Supp. 2d 152, 158−72 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 116. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 114, at i. 
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tribunals substantively violated the Geneva Conventions. It did so 
incidentally in a very internationalist manner.  
Hamdan decisively rejected the Bush administration’s assertion 
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not apply to 
Guantánamo detainees.117 Common Article 3 is a catch-all provision 
requiring that detainees in conflicts “not of an international 
character” be afforded basic humane treatment, including the right to 
be tried by a “regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.”118 The Bush administration had asserted that the term “not 
of an international character” meant that the provision could not 
apply to the “international” war between the United States and al 
Qaeda.119 The Supreme Court refused to defer to the executive’s 
interpretation120 and instead construed “international” as meaning 
“between nations.”121 The Court adopted the view that the Geneva 
Conventions provide a comprehensive regime for regulating armed 
conflict, and Common Article 3 excludes only conflicts between 
party nations because such conflicts are covered elsewhere in the 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632−35. 
 118. The provision is called a “common article” because it appears in all four Geneva Conventions. It 
provides in pertinent part: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as 
a minimum, the following provisions: 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees 
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 3. 
 119. 2002 Bush Memo, supra note 41; see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630 (noting the government’s 
argument). 
 120. In another internationalist move, the Court simply ignored the body of case law indicating that 
courts should give “great weight” to the executive’s “reasonable” interpretation of a treaty, a doctrine 
the Court had invoked just the day before in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006) 
(“[W]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of 
government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.” (quoting 
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961))). See generally Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating 
Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723 (2007) 
(analyzing approaches to deference in treaty interpretation). 
 121. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2005) (“The term ‘conflict not of an international 
character’ is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations.”). 
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Conventions.122 The Court concluded that Bush’s military tribunals, 
primarily because they were not authorized by Congress but also 
because they lacked certain procedural protections, failed to comport 
with Common Article 3’s requirement of a “regularly constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.”123 Amazingly, the Court was 
able to invalidate the tribunals on Geneva grounds without addressing 
the issue of whether the detainees had enforceable Geneva rights in 
the first place.  
So how was it possible that the Supreme Court found the tribunals 
to violate Geneva and struck them down, while simultaneously 
avoiding the question of whether Geneva-based claims are judicially 
cognizable? Justice Stevens cleverly but unfortunately did 
interpretive gymnastics to attain this result. The Court asserted that 
Common Article 3 applied to Hamdan, not because the Geneva 
Conventions are a valid source of enforceable rights, but because 
Common Article 3 is silently incorporated by domestic legislation, 
specifically the UCMJ.124 The UCMJ actually does not mention the 
Geneva Conventions and only briefly speaks of international law. 
Article 21 of the UCMJ states:  
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon 
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost 
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with 
respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of 
war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or 
other military tribunals.125  
The Court interpreted this provision as a domestic statutory 
requirement that Bush’s tribunals comport with international law, 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. at 630–31. 
 123. Id. at 630–35 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135). 
 124. Id. at 627–28. 
 125. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006). 
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including Common Article 3.126 Essentially, the Court treats the 
UCMJ as “executing” legislation. The problem with the Court’s 
analysis is that the legislative history of and expert consensus on 
Article 21 do not support this conclusion. Historians are in fair 
agreement that Article 21, whose predecessor provision was passed 
long before the Geneva Conventions, was meant only to ensure that 
the UCMJ’s creation of military courts martial would not alter the 
President’s pre-existing authority to convene executive wartime 
tribunals.127 It was not meant to require such tribunals to comport 
with the laws of war. 
The Supreme Court chose to give detainees Geneva rights by 
reading them into a domestic statute that had little to do with the 
treaty. Moreover, the Court knew that Congress was about to pass the 
Military Commissions Act (MCA), which expressly replaces the 
UCMJ where inconsistent.128 This Act is essentially a congressional 
stamp of approval on Bush’s military tribunal process.129 Although its 
tribunal procedures differ from those of Bush’s tribunals only 
slightly,130 the MCA states both that it fulfills any requirements of 
Common Article 3,131 and detainees subject to military trial may not 
                                                                                                                 
 126. In a single conclusory statement, the Court characterizes the UCMJ as “preserv[ing] what power, 
under the Constitution and the common law of war, the President had had before 1916 to convene 
military commissions—with the express condition that the President and those under his command 
comply with the law of war.” Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added). 
 127. Scott L. Silliman, On Military Commissions, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 529, 535 (2005) 
(“[T]he word ‘recognized’ is key to an accurate understanding [of Article 21] because it implies only 
acknowledgment, not establishment.”); David Stoelting, Military Commissions and Terrorism, 31 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 427, 429 (2003) (asserting that Article 21 does not authorize tribunals but 
rather “simply preserves the well–established jurisdiction of military commissions over crimes as 
established by statute or by the laws of war”). 
 128. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(d) (2006). 
 129. M. Elizabeth Magill, Can Process Cure Substance? A Response to Neal Katyal’s “Internal 
Separation of Powers,” 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 126, 129 (2006), available at 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/executive-power/can-process-cure-
substance?-a-response-to-neal-katyal%26%238217;s-%26%238220;internal-separation-of-
powers%26%238221 (“[MCA] substantially follows the President’s pre-Hamdan conception of military 
commissions.”). 
 130. See Gruber, supra note 33, at 1058–64 (comparing MCA to Bush’s tribunals). 
 131. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f) (2006) (“A military commission established under this chapter is a regularly 
constituted court, affording all the necessary ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
by civilized peoples’ for purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.”). 
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invoke the Geneva Conventions in litigation.132 Thus, any 
international law-like protection culled from UCMJ would be short-
lived and soon replaced by the MCA’s contempt for international 
law. 
As a consequence, although Hamdan might be seen as a liberal 
victory because it used the Geneva Conventions to give detainees 
greater rights, the case proved far less momentous as an indicator of 
the United States’ participation in a worldwide human rights regime. 
To the contrary, the Court deliberately chose to refrain from 
stemming the tide of anti-internationalism in American treaty 
jurisprudence, even though a statement on the status of treaties 
appeared by every indication warranted, if not required.  
It is difficult to say why the majority chose to secure Geneva rights 
through the UCMJ rather than addressing the self-execution issue 
head on. Perhaps there were not enough votes supporting Geneva 
enforceability, and the majority wanted to render immediate relief to 
the detainees. It could be that the majority feared prompting a 
presidential withdrawal from or congressional repeal of the Geneva 
Conventions. Maybe the Court’s silence on treaty status was merely 
overprotective but misguided judicial restraint. Attempting to 
discover the inner motivations of the justices is the province of Court 
historians and biographers. Nonetheless, as Professor Jordan Paust 
points out, “every violation of the laws of war is a war crime” and 
“such caution in the face of international crime is less than 
satisfying.”133 The “liberal” Hamdan majority certainly did not take 
the opportunity to affirm the status of treaties in a time when an 
understanding and acceptance of the international laws of war were 
more important than ever. This oversight paved the way for the single 
most exceptionalist Supreme Court treaty decision in history, 
Medellín v. Texas.134  
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. § 948b(g) (“No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission 
under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.”). 
 133. Paust, Mixed Record, supra note 29, at 841. 
 134. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), stay of execution denied, 129 S.Ct. 360 (2008). 
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IV.  WALKING THROUGH THE DOOR IN MEDELLÍN V. TEXAS 
Medellín is the Supreme Court’s “first case ever to deny relief 
solely on the ground that the treaty relied upon was non-self-
executing.”135 Medellín is the ultimate in a series of cases involving 
the United States’ violation of foreign nationals’ rights under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention).136 
The Vienna Convention, to which the United States is a party, 
guarantees foreign nationals arrested in signatory countries the right 
to meet with consular officials.137 The petitioner Medellín, a Mexican 
national, was arrested for murder in Texas. State officials did not 
afford Medellín the opportunity to confer with Mexican consular 
officials, and a Texas jury eventually convicted and sentenced him to 
death.138 Medellín raised the issue of Texas’s violation of the Vienna 
Convention in his state habeas corpus appeal. The state court 
dismissed the habeas appeal on procedural default grounds because 
Medellín had not raised the Vienna Convention issue in a timely 
manner during trial or direct appeal.139  
The United States Supreme Court had first ruled on the procedural 
default question in the 1998 case Breard v. Greene, holding that 
habeas petitioners’ Vienna Convention claims are subject to the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) 
procedural rules, just like all other habeas claims. The per curiam 
opinion contains language tending to indicate that the authors 
considered the Vienna Convention to confer enforceable rights. It 
states: 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial 
Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 601 (2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Law of the Land]. 
 136. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 352−353 (2006) (affirming Breard holding 
despite intervening contrary judgments by ICJ); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375−76 (1998) 
(holding that even assuming Vienna Convention is self-executing, petitioner’s claim of violation was 
barred because of procedural default in state habeas proceedings). 
 137. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
 138. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 500–05. 
 139. Id. 
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[A]lthough treaties are recognized by our Constitution as the 
supreme law of the land, that status is no less true of provisions 
of the Constitution itself, to which rules of procedural default 
apply . . . . The Vienna Convention—which arguably confers on 
an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest—
has continuously been in effect since 1969. But in 1996, before 
Breard filed his habeas petition raising claims under the Vienna 
Convention, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act . . . . Breard’s ability to obtain relief based on 
violations of the Vienna Convention is subject to this 
subsequently enacted rule, just as any claim arising under the 
United States Constitution would be.140 
After Breard, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) ruled in 
two separate cases, the 2001 LaGrand Case (involving a German 
national)141 and 2004 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Avena),142 that subjecting the Vienna Convention’s 
requirements to AEDPA’s procedural default rules violates the terms 
of the Convention. In Avena, the ICJ ordered the United States to 
conduct special hearings to determine whether the named Mexican 
nationals had been prejudiced by the Vienna Convention violation.143 
After Avena, President Bush issued a memorandum that the United 
States “[would] discharge its international obligations” under Avena 
“by having State courts give effect to the decision.”144 
In 2006, the Court in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon re-affirmed 
Breard’s procedural default holding in the face of the contrary ICJ 
decisions.145 The Court asserted that it would give the ICJ opinions 
no more deference than “respectful consideration,” which did not 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376. The claim that a self-executing treaty is subject to state procedural 
default rules has engendered its own critique. See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 4, at 677. 
 141. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
 142. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31) 
[hereinafter Avena]. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 503. 
 145. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
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compel a reversal of Breard.146 The political landscape and 
composition of the Court, which was now in the midst of sorting 
through the war on terror debate,147 had changed considerably since 
1998. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court evidences much 
more caution on the issue of treaty enforceability. The opinion notes 
that the government “strongly dispute[s]” that the Vienna Convention 
is self-executing and emphasizes the government’s position that 
treaties are presumptively non-self executing.148 Tellingly, the Court 
repeats the government’s selective quotation of an 1884 Supreme 
Court decision, Head Money Cases, for the proposition that a treaty 
“is primarily a compact between independent nations” and “depends 
for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of 
the governments which are parties to it.”149 The Court does not 
mention other language from the case, often ignored by treaty 
exceptionalists, which states that a treaty may “prescribe a rule by 
which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined,” 
and a “court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case 
before it as it would to a statute.”150 
Medellín’s case was not rendered moot by the holding in Sanchez-
Llamas, because unlike the defendants in that case, he was one of the 
individuals named in Avena. As a consequence, his argument was not 
about Supreme Court deference to ICJ interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention, but was about whether state officials were obligated to 
give effect to the ICJ judgment and grant the named individuals 
hearings.151 Medellín advanced two arguments in favor of 
enforcement: (1) Texas had an obligation to comply with treaties that 
require the United States to implement ICJ judgments; and (2) Texas 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. at 353. 
 147. The Sanchez-Llamas opinion was issued the day before Hamdan. 
 148. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S, at 343 (citing Brief for United States at 11, Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 
331 (2006) (No. 04-10566)). 
 149. Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 11, Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-
10566)).  
 150. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884). 
 151. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008). 
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had an obligation to comply with the President’s memorandum.152 Of 
concern here is the Court’s analysis of Medellín’s first claim. 
Chief Justice Roberts once again wrote the opinion of the Court, 
and noted as a threshold matter that Texas would have to comply 
with the judgment if Avena constituted “binding federal law” that 
could be invoked as a source of substantive rights.153 The United 
States is a signatory to two conventions that bear on the question of 
the force of the Avena ruling. The Optional Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention (Optional Protocol) provides that disputes regarding 
Convention interpretation fall under the “compulsory jurisdiction” of 
the ICJ.154 The United Nations Charter requires signatory nations to 
“undertake[] to comply” with ICJ rulings.155 The Court found that 
neither of these agreements required Texas to comply with Avena.156  
The Court’s analysis begins with the division between 
domestically enforceable self-executing treaties and unenforceable 
non-self-executing treaties.157 Again, such a division is acceptable to 
internationalists so long as non-self-executing treaties are confined to 
those that do not create individual rights or expressly forbid private 
lawsuits. Justice Roberts’s version of the division, however, seems to 
be an exceptionalist one, for he quickly forays into the land of 
presumptions against enforceability. As was foreshadowed by 
Sanchez-Llamas, he begins with the selected quote from the Head 
Money Cases, adding “of course” a treaty is “primarily a compact 
between independent nations.”158 Roberts, however, does include the 
language from Head Money Cases that self-executing treaties “have 
the force and effect of a legislative enactment.”159 It is, therefore, not 
entirely clear from this language whether the Court endorses the view 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Id. at 503–04. 
 153. Id. at 504. 
 154. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. I, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 
U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. 
 155. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1. 
 156. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 511. 
 157. Id. at 504–05. 
 158. Id. at 505 (quoting Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)) (emphasis added). 
 159. Id. at 505–06 (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)). 
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that treaties are presumptively non-self-executing and what the 
formula is for overcoming such a presumption.  
In a footnote, the Court makes this curious statement: “Even when 
treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the 
background presumption is that ‘[i]nternational agreements, even 
those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create 
private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic 
courts.’”160 The Court thus indicates that, in order to be enforced, 
treaties must pass two separate hurdles:161 (1) they must meet a self-
execution test (whatever that may be); and (2) they must contain 
“express language” that private individuals can sue to remedy 
violations.162 However, the Court does not apply the express private 
right of action requirement it apparently endorses. The Court could 
have disposed of Medellín’s claim simply by saying that neither of 
the treaties involved specified that individuals have a right to sue in 
national courts to force compliance with ICJ decisions. Instead, the 
Court’s limited discussions of standing invoke the statutory structure 
of the ICJ and U.N. Charter language, rather than the absence of 
express right-to-sue provisions. One argument asserts the ICJ statute 
expressly prohibits non-parties (the technical parties to Avena were 
the U.S. and Mexico) from seeking to enforce judgments.163 The 
other posits that the U.N. Charter’s “sole remedy” for a breach is 
U.N. Security Council action.164 Of course, there are strong 
objections to the contention that whenever a treaty specifies an 
international remedy it means to forbid domestic enforcement.165 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Id. at 506 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 907). 
 161. Id. at 547−49 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing opinion for “erect[ing] legalistic hurdles that 
can threaten” the application of existing treaties and negotiations of new ones). 
 162. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3 (citing approvingly the presumption that “treaties do not create 
privately enforceable rights in the absence of express language to the contrary”). 
 163. Id. at 511–12 (“Article 59 of the statute provides that ‘[t]he decision of the [ICJ] has no binding 
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.’”). 
 164. Id. at 492. 
 165. The argument is that the fact that a treaty contains international remedial procedures but leaves 
out domestic ones does not indicate that the treaty intended to make international remedies exclusive. A 
treaty is an appropriate place to set forth a single uniform international remedy, but it would be unwieldy 
and unwise for a multilateral treaty that involves multiple nations with differing legal systems to 
prescribe domestic processes. Id. at 548 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[G]iven the differences among nations, 
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Nevertheless, the Court stops far short of applying the express private 
right of action rule it appears to support. 
Turning back to self-execution, the Court indicates that the self-
execution inquiry is separate from the private right of action query. 
The question thus becomes exactly what constitutes Medellín’s test 
for self-execution. The major ambiguity in Medellín, and thus its 
saving grace for internationalists, is its failure to distinguish between 
two concepts of unenforceability: (1) the idea that a treaty is non-self-
executing if, by it terms, it does not create any justiciable rights or 
obligations; and (2) the concept that a treaty is non-self-executing 
even if it does create concrete rights or obligations but does not 
contain language indicating that the drafters intended “domestic 
effect.”166 The majority opinion contains some language tending to 
endorse the second view. It states, “[W]e have held treaties to be self-
executing when the textual provisions indicate that the President and 
Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic effect.”167 
Similar to its standing analysis, however, the Court does not apply 
the intent test it seems to support and instead focuses on 
demonstrating that the Optional Protocol and U.N. Charter 
substantively do not require the U.S. to implement the Avena ruling. 
The case would have been much worse for internationalists had the 
Court found that the Optional Protocol and U.N. Charter provisions 
clearly obligated the U.S. (and Texas) to comply immediately with 
the ICJ judgment, but Medellín could not sue to enforce the 
obligation because U.S. treaty makers had not intended the provisions 
to be domestically enforceable.168 Instead, what the Medellín majority 
                                                                                                                 
why would drafters write treaty language stating that a provision about, say, alien property inheritance, 
is self-executing? How could those drafters achieve agreement when one signatory nation follows one 
tradition and a second follows another?”). 
 166. Id. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that in determining self-execution, treaty text “matters 
very much” but “not because it contains language that explicitly refers to self-execution”). Justice 
Breyer further opines that drafting history is relevant to determine what the substantive obligations in 
the treaty are but that courts should not try to discover some intent to self-execute. Id. 
 167. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 519; see also Brief for United States at 5, Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331 
(2006) (No. 04-10566) (asserting that a treaty would be non-self-executing if it were “ratified without 
provisions clearly according it domestic effect”). 
 168. The dissent apparently interprets the majority provision as doing precisely this. Medellín, 552 
U.S. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (calling it “misguided” that the “majority looks for language about 
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did was interpret the scope of the substantive obligations contained 
within the Optional Protocol and U.N. Charter. The Court held that 
the Optional Protocol’s directive that parties “submit” to the 
“compulsory” authority of the ICJ only requires signatories to send 
cases to the ICJ and appear for hearings, but it does not require actual 
compliance with ICJ judgments.169 Regarding the U.N. Charter, the 
Court opined that “undertake[] to comply” only signifies that parties 
like the United States “pledged” their “faith” to one day create legal 
structures to enforce ICJ judgments.170 In essence, Justice Roberts 
makes the same questionable interpretive move as the Foster Court 
did when interpreting the Spanish treaty. The Medellín majority’s 
analysis renders the U.N. Charter language on ICJ judgments 
basically meaningless because it does not actually bind the 
signatories to comply with ICJ judgments.171 Questionable as the 
interpretive analysis may be, it does not simply discard the treaty 
provisions because there is no language on self-execution. 
However, at the tail end of the opinion, the Court again shifts into 
exceptionalist mode and concludes that “while the ICJ’s judgment in 
Avena creates an international law obligation on the part of the 
United States, it does not of its own force constitute binding federal 
law.”172 Yet given its interpretive analysis, it is hard to understand 
exactly what international obligation the United States has, since 
“undertak[ing] to comply” does not mean compliance.173 The bottom 
line is that, despite catch phrases to the contrary, the Court resolves 
Medellín’s claims for relief on the ground that the Optional Protocol 
and U.N. Charter simply do not create the substantive duties Medellín 
claimed. Thus, despite any disagreement with Roberts’s 
                                                                                                                 
‘self-execution’ in the treaty itself and . . . erects ‘clear statement’ presumptions designed to help find an 
answer”). 
 169. Id. at 508. 
 170. Id. (asserting that the Charter “does not provide that the United States ‘shall’ or ‘must’ comply 
with an ICJ decision”). 
 171. See supra notes 153−55 and accompanying text. 
 172. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 523. 
 173. This interpretation clearly gives the United States a “get out of ICJ judgment free card,” again 
signaling U.S. aversion to international law. It was also unnecessary given that the U.S. had withdrawn 
from the Optional Protocol after Avena. See supra note 109. 
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interpretation of treaty text,174 an internationalist might see an 
optimistic aspect of the Court’s self-execution analysis.175 Medellín 
leaves some room to argue that what the Court meant by non-self-
executing is simply that the treaty at issue does not create rights and 
obligations.176 Perhaps, the argument can still be made that a treaty 
that clearly grants individuals rights, like the Geneva Conventions, is 
by its very nature self-executing.177 
V.  A SECOND CHANCE FOR THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
It appears likely that the Supreme Court will not rule on the 
domestic enforceability of the Geneva Conventions any time soon. 
Congress, through the MCA, has now set forth specific processes 
governing military trials of “alien unlawful combatants.” These 
tribunals obviously comply with any constitutional mandate that 
military tribunals be established by both political branches of 
government.178 The fact that Congress has approved the tribunals also 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 534 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s interpretation of 
“undertake to comply”); see also Vázquez, Law of the Land, supra note 135, at 661 (“In international 
law usage, an ‘undertaking’ is well recognized to be a hard, immediate obligation.”). 
 175. For example, Professor Vazquez asserts: 
Fortunately, the opinion supports an alternative reading, under which Medellín can be 
understood to have found the relevant treaty to be non-self-executing because the 
obligation it imposed required the exercise of nonjudicial discretion. So read, Medellín is 
an example of an entirely distinct form of non-self-execution, and is thus consistent with 
. . . a presumption that treaties are self-executing in the Foster sense. 
Vázquez, Law of the Land, supra note 135, at 608. 
 176. This would be interpreting the majority opinion to mean what Justice Stevens’s concurring 
opinion states. Justice Stevens opines: 
I agree that the text and history of the Supremacy Clause, as well as this Court’s treaty-
related cases, do not support a presumption against self-execution. (citation omitted) I 
also endorse the proposition that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is itself 
self-executing and judicially enforceable. Moreover, I think this case presents a closer 
question than the Court’s opinion allows. In the end, however, I am persuaded that the 
relevant treaties do not authorize this Court to enforce the judgment of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals. 
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 533 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 177. There is still, however, the private right of action hurdle that the Court seemed to endorse. See 
supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text. Such a rule would prevent enforcement of the Conventions 
even via habeas corpus. See supra note 104. 
 178. Again, Hamdan did not go so far as to require this, but at least required that such tribunals not 
violate a pre-existing Congressional limitation. See supra note 53. There is a possibility, however, that 
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helps to satisfy Common Article 3’s requirement of a “regularly 
constituted court.” Indeed, the MCA proclaims itself to be in 
compliance with Common Article 3.179 Experts, however, argue that 
in fact many of the procedures in the MCA are incompatible with 
Common Article 3’s requirement that courts provide “all the judicial 
guarantees [which are] recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.”180 Conceivably, then, a detainee subject to military trial 
under the MCA could assert that his Geneva rights are being violated. 
If such a case were to arrive at the Supreme Court, the Court would 
not be able to “backdoor” the Geneva Conventions through UCMJ 
Article 21, as it did in Hamdan, because the MCA expressly replaces 
the UCMJ where inconsistent.181 Thus, in order to enforce such a 
detainee’s Geneva rights, the Court would have to decide the self-
execution question.  
Of course, the Supreme Court might simply find that the MCA 
complies with Common Article 3, rendering a decision on self-
execution unnecessary, or strike down the tribunals on domestic 
grounds. Moreover, it could possibly bypass the self-execution 
question all together by holding that the MCA replaced contrary 
Geneva provisions as a “last-in-time” statute.182 However, courts 
generally look for clear language before finding that a treaty has been 
superseded by statute.183 Although the MCA does seek to stop 
                                                                                                                 
the Court could further refine its constitutional analysis regarding war power and invalidate the tribunals 
on domestic constitutional grounds. 
 179. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f) (2006).  
 180. Benjamin G. Davis, No Third Class Processes for Foreigners, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
88, 99 (2008); David L. Franklin, Enemy Combatants and the Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1001, 1006 (2008); Gruber, supra note 33, at 1058 (discussing “several important 
variances between MCA and UCMJ procedures”). 
 181. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. In addition, the MCA makes clear that it does not 
seek to incorporate law of war protections more extensive than its own provisions. See 10 U.S.C. 
§ 948b(f)–(g).  
 182. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 183. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (citing cases); 
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) 
(superseding treaty requires “explicit statutory language”); Pigeon River Imp., Slide & Boom Co. v. 
Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934) (stating that “intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is 
not to be lightly imputed to the Congress”); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1)(a) (1987) (stating that legislation must 
have clear purpose to supersede treaty). 
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individual invocations of the Geneva Conventions in military trials, 
elsewhere it confirms that the Geneva Conventions retain the force of 
international law.184 If the MCA is insufficiently clear to constitute an 
express repeal of Geneva, the novel question becomes whether 
Congress, without repealing a treaty, can “unexecute” it, that is, force 
it to become non-self-executing.185  
This is, however, a question the Court will not likely address, 
given that military tribunals are being phased out and the number of 
detainees is decreasing. Since the June 2008 decision in Boumediene 
v. Bush permitting detainees to bring habeas corpus petitions despite 
the MCA’s habeas-stripping provisions,186 district courts have 
demonstrated a willingness to release detainees. For example, the 
district court for the District of Columbia ordered the release of 
Boumediene and several others on the ground that the government 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they were 
“enemy combatants.”187 Hundreds of other detainees have been 
released discretionarily and, as of the writing of this Essay in January 
2010, only 196 remain.188 On January 22, 2009, President Obama 
signed an Executive Order to shut down the Guantánamo facility 
                                                                                                                 
 184. For example, the MCA states, “A military commission established under this chapter is a 
regularly constituted court, affording all the necessary ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples’ for purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.” 
MCA, 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f) (2006). See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the 
Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 82 (2007) (noting 
MCA’s “clear intent to preserve the Geneva Conventions intact”). 
 185. Addressing this question, Professor Vázquez states, “[T]here is no evidence that Congress 
intended to ‘unexecute’ the self-executing provisions of the Geneva Conventions or otherwise deny any 
part of them domestic legal force. A congressional attempt to do so, moreover, would raise substantial 
questions under the Supremacy Clause.” Vázquez, supra note 184, at 91−92. Even graver concerns 
would be raised if the “un-execution” was permitted to have retroactive effect. Cf. Gruber, supra note 
33, at 1063 (“MCA’s directive that individual detainees are prohibited from invoking the Conventions 
can be seen merely as Congress’s post-ratification view of Geneva self-execution, which is itself not 
dispositive of and perhaps irrelevant to the treaty’s status.”). Resolving the “un-execution” question in 
the affirmative would be decidedly anti-internationalist. Like the conservative construction of the self-
execution issue, it essentially allows Congress to tailor the force of human rights conventions 
domestically while duplicitously purporting to support such rights. See supra notes 110–11 and 
accompanying text. 
 186. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 187. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp.2d 191, 197–98 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 188. See Peter Finn, Justice Task Force Recommends about 50 Guantanamo Detainees be Held 
Indefinitely, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/21/AR2010012104936.html. 
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within a year and harmonize U.S. interrogation tactics with the 
Geneva Conventions.189 The one terrorism detention case pending at 
the time before the Supreme Court that might have brought the 
Geneva Conventions back into play, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli,190 was 
rendered moot in February 2009 when President Obama transferred 
Al-Marri’s case to the criminal system.191 
Still, recent events have served to revive the debate over military 
tribunals. The one-year deadline for closing Guantanamo has come 
and gone.192 Moreover, President Obama, apparently under pressure 
from Congress, has retreated from his commitment to permanently 
close the Bush terrorism play-book.193 He now endorses military 
trials, albeit under an apparently more civil-rights oriented version of 
Bush’s commissions,194 and supports indefinite detention of certain 
                                                                                                                 
 189. The Executive Order reads in pertinent part: 
The detention facilities at Guantánamo for individuals covered by this order shall be 
closed as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this order. If 
any individuals covered by this order remain in detention at Guantánamo at the time of 
closure of those detention facilities, they shall be returned to their home country, 
released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to another United States detention 
facility in a manner consistent with law and the national security and foreign policy 
interests of the United States. 
Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4, 897 (Jan. 22, 2009).  
 190. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008) (granting certiorari). 
 191. “Enemy Combatant” Ali al-Marri Charged for Alleged Role in Terrorist Activities, FOX NEWS, 
Feb. 27, 2009, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,501788,00.html. The Supreme Court 
more recently dismissed the “Uighur case” from its docket and remanded the case to district court. 
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam). However, this case was in any event unlikely 
to raise Geneva Convention issues because the case was about the propriety of a habeas court ordering 
the release of unquestionably unlawfully detained prisoners into the United States. Id. The issue was not 
the legality of the detention under international law. 
 192. One Year Later, Guantanamo Still Open, CBS NEWS, Jan. 22, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/22/politics/main6129494.shtml. 
 193. Jonathan Weisman & Evan Perez, Obama Leans Toward Switch to Military Trials on 9/11, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748703915204575103703790191316.html (noting that Congress’s threat to cut funding 
to civilian trials and local government resistance has led the Obama administration to favor trying 
Khalid Sheik Mohammed in a military tribunal, despite a pledge to try him in federal court in New 
York); Ed Pilkington, Obama to Continue Military Tribunals at Guantánamo, THE GUARDIAN, May 15, 
2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/15/guantanamo-bay-military-trial-obama 
(noting that the Guantánamo closure issue “has increasingly been highlighted by Republican politicians 
who see it as a potential stick with which to beat the administration, and many Democrats, nervous 
about the reaction of their constituents, have also expressed their alarm”). 
 194. See Lara Jakes, Obama to Revive Military Tribunals for Gitmo Detainees, with More Rights, 
HUFFINGTON POST, May 14, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/14/obama-to-
revive-military-_n_203783.html. 
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terror suspects.195 Meanwhile, trials under MCA procedures are on-
going.196 As a consequence, the possibility that the Supreme Court 
will have another opportunity to rule on Geneva’s applicability to the 
war on terror still exists. If the occasion arises, the Supreme Court 
will have another chance to turn “the legal world right-side up 
again”197 and to show that it is not a “lone ranger”198 by affirming the 
domestic enforceability of the Geneva Conventions. Although 
Medellín may have created yet another legalistic barrier between the 
“war” detainees199 and their human rights, the case leaves some room 
for a future decision giving effect to the Geneva Conventions.  
CONCLUSION 
As President Obama inches ever closer to embracing the “twilight 
zone” model of terrorism law, it would be wise to keep in mind the 
reputational harm the Bush administration’s war on terror caused the 
United States. One human rights advocate warned the Obama 
administration, “The results of the cases [tried in military 
commissions] will be suspect around the world. It is a tragic mistake 
to continue them.”200 More than just a source of embarrassment, there 
are real consequences to America’s sullied international reputation. 
Our experiments with “alternative” military justice not only affect 
                                                                                                                 
 195. See supra note 188 (observing that the Obama administration has identified fifty Guantánamo 
inmates that should be held indefinitely). 
 196. Apparently, government lawyers, now part of the Obama administration, are continuing to rely 
on evidence obtained through torture. Del Quentin Wilber, ACLU Says Government Used False 
Confessions, WASH. POST, July 2, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/01/AR2009070103477.html. 
 197. Koh, supra note 50, at 2352. 
 198. Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 335.  
 199. There is some point at which the Court is going to have to grapple with whether terrorism 
detentions fall within a war paradigm. Thus far, the fact that the cases have involved Taliban or al Qaeda 
persons with a connection to Afghanistan combined with continuing war-like conditions in Afghanistan 
have allowed the Court to presume a war paradigm. See supra note 32. One expert notes that 
characterizing terrorism as part of war furthers terrorists’ agenda by “allow[ing] terrorists to portray 
themselves as military figures and their victims as ‘collateral damage.’” Pilkington, supra note 193 
(quoting Shayana Kadidal, Guantánamo lawyer with the Centre for Constitutional Rights). 
 200. See Human Rights Activists Assail President Obama’s Decision on Military Commissions, ABC 
NEWS: POLITICAL PUNCH, (May 15, 2009, 7:26 PM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/ 
2009/05/human-rights-ac.html (quoting Gabor Rona, International Legal Director of Human Rights 
First). 
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our high court’s world influence, they operatively prevent the United 
States from assuming a leadership role in defining and defending 
international human rights. For example, in 2007, the Chinese 
government responded to the U.S. State Department’s annual human 
rights report by stating that America had no standing to comment on 
others’ human rights violations given its conduct of the war on terror. 
Specifically, the Chinese characterized the United States as “pointing 
the finger” at other nations while ignoring its “flagrant record of 
violating the Geneva Convention.”201 Supreme Court validation of 
treaty law would no doubt help repair the international reputation of 
the United States.202  
The lesson here is about fear and missed opportunity. Guantánamo 
stands as a stark reminder of the great importance of international 
humanitarian law during times of crisis. The Geneva Conventions 
were the very barrier between terrorism detainees and a government 
regime singularly committed to national security through any means 
possible. Unfortunately, when international law mattered most, even 
the liberal Supreme Court justices avoided cementing its legal status. 
By contrast, Medellín, a convicted murderer, was apparently afforded 
the full panoply of constitutional protections, and in all likelihood, his 
inability to confer with consular officials did not prejudice his case. 
Much less was at stake, and those on the Supreme Court critical of 
humanitarian law impediments to waging the war on terror could 
fashion anti-internationalist rules with little public fanfare or liberal 
resistance. Consequently, although Hamdan will likely go down in 
history as evidence of the Court’s willingness to protect individual 
rights in the face of massive public fear and executive pressure, it 
also represents a failure to truly support the comprehensive 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See Edward Cody, Beijing Hits Back at U.S. for Raising Rights Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 
2007, at A16, available at  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/08/AR2007030800747.html. 
 202. Even if the President forges ahead with policies contrary to international humanitarian law, the 
Court can still do its part to salvage U.S. reputation. As one scholar writes, “An unequivocal cue from 
the Supreme Court about the importance of international and comparative standards would have sent an 
important human rights message and may have averted controversy and embarrassment resulting from 
executive policies.” Laura E. Little, Transnational Guidance in Terrorism Cases, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 1, 14 (2006). 
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international regime governing war-time detention, a regime in which 
the United States long ago vowed to participate. But all may not be 
lost. The Supreme Court might have another chance to rule on the 
status of the Geneva Conventions, and Medellín leaves some wiggle 
room on self-execution. If the Supreme Court is once again to be a 
beacon of judicial light, it must move beyond the xenophobic 
exceptionalism of the Bricker past and embrace the straightforward 
and fair principle that signed and ratified treaties are the law of the 
land. 
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